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For decades the debate on pensions has focused on the “accumulation phase”
of the life-cycle. Many specific research topics have been explored as this liter-
ature has developed. However, they were all in one way or another concerned
by the adequacy of saving. In other words, the main focus of the existing liter-
ature has been on the question of setting enough resources aside to keep the
flow of consumption relatively stable after retirement. The main topics in this
line have included the relative merits of pay-as-you go and funded pensions,
the issue of early retirement in a world of increasing longevity and the threat
of aging on the financial viability of pensions systems. It is only recently that
some economists have started to be concerned by the “forgotten half” of re-
tirement security: the “decumulation phase” (also called the “payout phase”).
It is our belief that there both will and should be more research on this phase
in the future.
Why should there be such a change in emphasis? A cynical answer would
be that so much has been written on the relative merits of PAYGO and fully
funded pensions, on the issue of privatizations, on the need of fostering ac-
tivity rates of elderly workers, and so on, that pension economists are forced
to seek new and unplowed fields. This is a rather negative view. We also see
at least three positive reasons to explain the surge of interest in the decumu-
lation phase: the continuing shift from “defined benefits” to “defined contri-
butions” pensions both in the public and in the private sector, the thinness
of the annuity market, and the demographic changes.
In countries like Germany or France, the main source of retirement in-
come has for decades consisted of annuitized benefits from contributory
pensions. In such a setting, one understands that the payout phase was not a
big concern. The government provided a safe and adequate flow of resources
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during the full length of retirement. For better or for worse, these are be-
coming exceptional cases. In most countries we observe a continuous trend
toward defined contributions pensions that offer at the time of retirement a
lump sum capital without the obligation (or the appropriate incentives) of
converting it into a flow of annuities.
Collective annuities that are associated with traditional social security sys-
tems are known to require relatively small loading factors. This is because
they avoid the adverse selection trap of individual annuities and because they
incur low administrative costs (at least in per contract terms). To some extent
the same remarks apply to private defined benefit pensions. They offer an-
nuities that are more attractive than those one can purchase on an individual
basis. The reasons for the relative inefficiency of individual annuities are well
known: thinness of the market, adverse selection, scale economies, etc. Some
of them are discussed in this volume. The thinness of the annuity market
can be explained by the paradoxical low demand for annuities, what is called
the “annuity puzzle.” Conversely the annuity puzzle can be explained by the
thinness of the market and its ensuing inefficiency.
The third reason for this new concern for the decumulation side of pen-
sions is demographic. Longevity increases, but so does the length of retire-
ment, that is, the length of the decumulation phase. Furthermore, this in-
crease is not accompanied by a decline in the uncertainty of mortality. Up to
the age of 60 the rate of mortality has decreased in most industrialized coun-
tries, and survival until age 60 is becoming more and more certain. Beyond,
the uncertainty of survival continues to be important.
This volume contains a selection of papers that were presented at the
CESifo Venice Summer Institute held July 16–17, 2007, on the theme
“Longevity and annuitization.” In addition, it includes some papers that were
submitted in reply to the call for paper papers published in this journal. Sev-
eral papers are devoted to the issue of annuities. Others study the problems
raised by an increase in longevity or by the fact that longevity varies across
individuals and may even be endogenous (depend on individual and collec-
tive actions). There are also papers that deal with both questions. Finally, we
include a paper that examines the behavioral dimension of pensions when
individuals are myopic. Myopia here is about time preference but it could
as well concern mortality prospects. We now present an overview of these
contributions and start with those devoted to annuities.
1. Annuities and Portfolio Choice
The first paper, “Refundable annuities (annuity options)” by Eytan Sheshinski
assumes that individuals cope with uncertainty about the length of life by
purchasing annuities early in life. However, they also face other uninsurable
contingencies (e.g., income risk). These situations create an active residual
annuity market based on the arrival of new information over time. Sheshinski
characterizes the equilibrium in the residual annuity market and proposes
a new financial instrument, namely refundable annuities with a guaranteed
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refund price. This instrument enables individuals to better adjust their opti-
mum consumption plan to different realizations. Refundable annuities are
shown to be equivalent to annuity options, that is, options to purchase annu-
ities later in life at a predetermined price. Holding a variety of refundable
annuities is (ex ante) welfare enhancing.
In their paper “Collective annuities and redistribution,” Helmuth Cremer,
Jean Marie Lozachmeur, and Pierre Pestieau consider a society where in-
dividuals differ in both productivity and longevity, those two characteristics
being positively correlated. The utilitarian first-best optimum is considered
as a benchmark. It can be decentralized with individual actuarially fair annu-
ities and lump-sum redistribution from short- to long-lived individuals and
from high to low productivity individuals. The authors study the role of alter-
native pension systems that offer collective annuities (i.e., annuities that do
not depend on individual survival probabilities). Within the context of linear
pension schemes, a pure contributory (Bismarckian) pension and a flat rate
(Beveridgean) pension are contrasted. It is shown that the case for collective
annuities is stronger when they are associated with a flat pension system. Then
nonlinear pension schemes are studied. It is shown that the solution can be
implemented with pension payments that are in between individual and col-
lective annuities. In other words, benefits do depend on life expectancy, but
to a lesser degree than with actuarially fair private annuities.
In “Flexible life annuities” Alexis Drirer compares fixed annuities to flex-
ible annuities from the viewpoint of social welfare. Flexible annuities offer
subscribers the possibility to choose between different levels of annuities. In
the case where agents gradually discover their actual probability of survival,
a unique predetermined annuity plan is sufficient. However, when an expen-
diture risk is added to the longevity risk, a flexible annuity plan is better even
though it is not sufficient to achieve a consumption path that is independent
of uninsured expenses.
The paper “Portfolio choice under uncertain lifetime” by Antoine Bommier
revisits the theory on life cycle savings and portfolio choice under uncertain
lifetime emphasizing the role of temporal risk aversion. It provides new in-
sights on the impact of mortality rates on optimal financial strategies. This
is of particular interest for the management of pension funds and is at odds
with findings based on the traditional temporal risk neutrality implicit in
standard models a` la Yaari, Merton or Samuelson. For instance, temporal risk
aversion implies that optimal financial strategies should depend on mortal-
ity rates. Consequently, pension-fund managers should revise their financial
strategies in response to the evolution of longevity. Furthermore, they should
provide pensions that are indexed on more or less risky funds, according to
an individual’s age.
Hippolyte d’Albis and Emmanuel Thibault in “Annuities; bequests and port-
folio diversification,” analyze the diversification motives of the demand for an-
nuities. In a model allowing for the uncertainty of longevity and interest
rate, the individual is assumed to choose an optimal portfolio to maximize a
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bequest. The authors derive and discuss the conditions under which an in-
crease in the risk of bond returns increases the demand for annuities. More-
over, they show that, contrary to previous claims, more risk aversion may be
associated with a lower demand for annuities.
2. Variable Longevity and Public Policy
A second series of papers deals with the issue of variable and possibly endoge-
nous longevity and its consequences for public policy.
In his paper, “Unequal longevities and lifestyles transmission,” Gregory Pon-
thiere is concerned by the design of optimal taxation when longevity is en-
dogenous. Unequal longevities result from differences in lifestyles and the
composition of the population regarding different lifestyles is endogenously
determined. In other words, Ponthiere assumes that unequal longevities are
the unintended outcome of differences in lifestyles and that lifestyles are
transmitted across generations. This is in sharp contrast with traditional taxa-
tion under heterogeneous longevity models that assume fixed heterogeneity
of lifestyles. He develops a three-period OLG model where the population,
who ignores the negative impact of excessive work on longevity, is parti-
tioned in two groups with different tastes for leisure, and follows an adap-
tation/imitation process a` la Bisin and Verdier (2001). The optimal short-
and long-run (Pigouvian) taxes on wages are shown to differ. This is because
the long-run tax corrects agents’ myopia. In addition, it internalizes intergen-
erational externalities due to the socialization process.
Mathias Kifmann in his paper “The design of pension pay out options when
the health status during retirement is uncertain” examines the optimal pension
schemes when health during retirement is uncertain and influences both
longevity and the marginal utility of consumption. The main finding is that
the possibility of opting between annuities and lump-sum payment at the time
of retirement may be welfare enhancing if the health status is not observable.
Such a welfare improvement occurs when the marginal utility of consumption
and life expectancy are negatively correlated.
The paper “The political economy of social security under differential mortality
and voluntary retirement” by Marie-Louise Leroux looks at the pension system
that would be chosen by a majority of individuals in a setting wherein in-
dividuals differ in longevity and choose their age of retirement. The main
conclusion is that the majority equilibrium implies a positive public pension
when longevity density is left-skewed. It also appears that the generosity of
the system increases with the average level of longevity.
In “On optimal lifetime redistribution policy” Sanna Tenhunen and Matti Tuo-
mala examine various aspects of the optimal lifetime redistribution policy
when individuals differ not only in productivity, but also in time preference.
Given the complexity of the analysis they use both an analytical and a nu-
merical approach. Their results provide a rationale for distortions (upward
and downward) in savings behavior in a simple two-period model where
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high-skilled and low-skilled individuals have different nonobservable time
preferences. The numerical results suggest that retirement consumption is
less dispersed than the first-period consumption in a paternalistic case. Pa-
ternalistic policy also increases second-period consumption compared to the
welfarist case.
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